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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
LEO WOLMAN
NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH
I. THE NATURE AND TYPES OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
The assumption by the general community of the responsibility
for unemployment is a phenomenon of comparatively recent origin.
Gradually an increasing section of public opinion has come to recognize
that unemployment is not a matter of personal responsibility and that
as a problem it cannot be met by throwing the burden on those who
happen to be unfortunate enough to be out of work.It is, of course,
still a common practice to entrust the support of the unemployed to
agencies of private and public charity.But in the main there is a strong
and growing tendendy to devise new and more substantial methods for
dealing with the problem.Such methods as have been devised rest
almost universally on the assumptions that the incidence of unemploy-
ment is beyond the control of the unemployed persons and that adequate
measures of treatment will lead ultimately to the control and reduction
of involuntary idleness.
Among the many measures proposed for the treatment of unemploy-
ment, insurance, in one form or another, has found the most general
acceptance.The principles on which unemployment insurance is based
are relatively simple, although in practice many real difficulties are
always encountered and are not always overcome.The procedure in a
system of unemployment insurance is at bottom no different from that
pursued in any other form of insurance.Once the risk, against which
people wish to insure, is discovered and defined, those who suffer from
the risk associate themselves for the purposes of mutual protection.
The form of the association and conditions for memberthip in it, may,
vary widely according to circumstances.Since the purpose of the
association is protection against losses in income due to unemployment,
the first task of the enterprise is to collect an insurance fund from which
unemployed members may draw during the whole or part of their periods of
idleness.'Creation of the fund and the establishment of the right to draw
from it require the determination of premiums, or rates of contribution,
'A doubtful statement.—Note by T, S. ADAMS.
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andof rates of benefit.Where the risk has been studied for a long time
and where a considerable body of accurate and continuous statistical
material has been collected, the risk can be measured with precision
and the of both contribution and benefit calculated with a high
degree of accuracy.In this regard, as is well known, all systems of
insurance are by no means alike.While, for instance, the premium on a
life insurance policy can now be determined within a negligible margin of
error, the premium on an unemployment insurance policy can at this
time lay no such claim to precision.To what extent, therefore, unemploy-
ment has become an insurable risk, in the ordinary sense of the term,
is a question which will be discussed in some detail later.
As commonly considered, however, unemployment insurance falls
into the special class of insurance undertakings known as social insurance.
The line of division between social insurance and the ordinary or private
insurance is not a sharp one.The distinction is one that has arisen in
a practice dictated by considerations of social policy.Unemployment,
like industrial disease and industrial accidents, is one of the hazards
of industry which attacks great masses of workers who do not set up, and
probably cannot be expected on their own initiative to setadequate
insurance against the risks involved.It is not necessary to consider
here the question of whether the working out of economic laws would
in the end require the cost of such insurance to be borne by the workers,
the employers, or the state, or by the consumers of the goods produced.
The essential fact is that, if insurance is to be provided against the recur-
ring distress due to unemployment, the initiative in establishing such
insurance must be taken either by the state or by the employers, or
both, acting in cooperation with the workers.The question of how
the insurance premiums are collected, or by whom and in what manner
they are (directly or indirectly) finally paid, is not the determining one
as to the character of the insurance.If considerations of public policy
indicate that insurance should be provided, and if, furthermore, the
surrounding conditions are such that voluntary action toward such
provision will not naturally be taken by those immediately affected,
and if the people as a whole must, in some manner take the initiative
in establishing the required protection, then the insurance resulting may
properly be described as social insurance.
In practice, there are many variations in the details of schemes of social
insurance, notably in industrial accident insurance, or workmen's com-
pensation.Here in many instances the insurance provides not only
for the compulsory payment of benefit to those, who have had their
incomes interrupted by industrial accident, but imposes the payment
of the entire premium upon the employer on the general theory that
the cost of such insurance is a legitimate burden upon the industry.
By the operation of this provision which makes large risks costly, it is304 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
hoped to supply the incentives thatwililead to the study and
analysis of the particular hazard and, finally, to its reduction or total
elimination.
These variations in the principles of social insurance have been
accompanied by changes in the form and content of systems of social
insurance.Almost from the beginning of the discussion of such schemes,
controversies have raged over their details.In the main the important
discussion has been concerned with three issues.One is the relative
desirability of compulsory as contrasted with voluntary insurance;
the second, the advantages of contributory against non-contributory
insurance; and the third, the merits of subsidized insurance.Later
experience has proved pretty conclusively that only two of these issues are
real.Both, in fact, lead to the question whether it is possible to organize
a system of social insurance in which all of the people who need the
insurance are included and in which the premiums they pay can yield
adequate benefits, unless such a system is made compulsory by statutory
enactment and provides, at least for a long time, liberal subsidies from
either employers or the state or from both.However this question may
be answered, the fact is that the trend in social insurance and particularly
in unemployment insurance, is unmistakeably in the direction of com-
pulsory and subsidized insurance.
To the student of all types of social insurance, unemployment insur-
ance offers a rich field of inquiry.Throughout Europe and the United
States, the problem of unemployment is met by conceivable
combination of types of unemployment insurance.In Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Norway, and other countries of Europe, unemployment
benefits are paid by trade unions and subsidies are received from the
state.Occasionally the payment of benefit stops with members of trade
unions or benefit societies and at other times provision is made for
subsidies to those who do not belong to such associations.In Italy,
Austria, Russia, and England, unemployment benefits are provided by
compulsory state insurance schemes.
In the United States, a scattering of trade unionists receive bene-
fits from their trade unions; in one industry the payment of insurance is
compulsory on the employers, and workers do not contribute at all;
and in a few cases insurance is voluntarily provided for the workingmen
by the employers.American experience with unemployment insurance,
while of short duration and limited in its extent, has already developed
features which distinguish it sharply from the forms of insurance current
in Europe.Without the spur of legislation a few employers, in diverse
industries, have laid aside funds from which their employees draw benefits
during periods of unemployment.The level of benefits provided by
these funds runs as high as from 50 to 90 per cent of the normal wages
of the workers.In each case, also, the payment of unemployment bene-UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 305
fitsis coupled with serious, and in the main successful, attempts to
regularize the business and thus to reduce unemployment.In the field
of proposed legislation, likewise, the reduction of unemployment is the
primary purpose of the suggested laws.Unlike the foreign precedents,
American proposals in the states of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and
Wisconsin are so framed as to grade insurance premiums with regard
to the unemployment experience of particular firms.Features such as
these, it is hoped, will encourage regularization and the reduction of
unemployment, since with an improvement in his employment record
an employer will be rewarded either by a refund or by a reduction in
his insurance premium.The present status and the extent of American
schemes are considered in some detail in the third part of this chapter.
All of these experiments in unemployment aid are naturally affected
by the peculiar conditions of each country.They can be studied effec-
tively, therefore, only on the spot, and not even then without an intimate
acquaintance with the local background. A number of them, moreover,
have been in existence for only short periods and have accumulated
little experience.Without doubt the most illuminating experiment
with unemployment insurance is that which has been conducted by
England without interruption since 1911.Prior to the adoption of the
Unemployment Insurance Act in that year, England had employed all the
devices that were then known for helping the unemployed. Many of
the English trade unions paid unemployed benefits.Local and national
authoritiescontributedpoorrelief.Employment exchanges were
experimented with and funds were liberally appropriated for public
works.The net effect of all of these expedients fell far short of what was
needed.Trade union benefits touched only a small proportion of the
working population.Money subsidies that were designed to help working-
men, pauperised them.Emergency public works mounted so rapidly in
cost through the inefficiency and unsteadiness of labor as to make their
continuance impossible and undesirable.'
On this background, the government of England began in 1909 the
organization of an ambitious unemployment program which has proved
the most interesting of any such plans.The first step in the program
was the organization in 1910 of a national system of employment
exchanges.This was followed in 1911 by the enactment of a compulsory
unemployment insurance scheme which in 1912 covered more than 2,000,-
000 people and which in 1920 was extended to cover practically the whole
industrial working population of England, or roughly 12,000,000 men
and women.During the ten years of its operation, the original act has
been frequently amended in many particulars.The scheme has, more-
over, existed through a period which has been as rich in the variety of
'Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws andReliefof Distress, Command
4499, 1909, Part VI, Chap. 3.
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its political and industrial incident as probably any period of similar
length in the history of the world.For almost two years the scheme
met the conditions of pre-war industry.Suddenly, in 1914, it was
confronted with problems of war and mobilization.Then came the
growth of the munitions industries and the period of great industrial
activity.In 1918, almost without warning, both the military and indus-
trial armies were demobilized.Thousands were left without work.
Soon upon this came the short post-war boom, and at last the collapse of
industry in the depression of 1920.
Like all public enterprises in England, the system of employment
exchanges and of unemployment insurance has been subjected to frequent
and expert scrutiny.The ten years' experience of England with unem-
ployment insurance has been laid bare in one report or another, in the
testimony before an investigation committee or in the memoranda of
the Government Actuary.It would seem necessary, therefore, to pref-
ace a considered estimate of the principles and practice of any type of
unemployment insurance by a careful analysis of the experience of
England since 1909 with its unemployment legislation.
II. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN ENGLAND
Although the English system of unemployment insurance has been in
operation for about ten years, it cannot be said to have passed yet, for
certain purposes, out of the experimental stage.The recognition of this
fact by the various British governments, which have legislated for the
scheme and administered it, has resulted in the trial in England of many
devices peculiar to no single system of unemployment insurance.Enum-
eration of these features of the British system, including those that were
discarded as well as those that were retained, will bring to light practi-
cally all of the elements that are essential to any well conceived and work-
able proposal for unemployment insurance.These elements will not, of
course, always appear in the form in which they were used in the English
legislation and administration, but essentially they are the elements
which will be taken into account in any scheme for unemployment
insurance.If, therefore, these elements can be distinguished and their
course during the British experience can be understood, the road should
be clear for fruitful generalization concerning the type of unemploy-
ment insurance that will most successfully meet the needs of modern
communities.
The Maintenance of the Unemployed during Periods of Unemploy-
ment.—No matter what unemployment insurance may become in the
future, its first purpose at present and in the past has been to support
the unemployed.One primary test of the success of such a scheme of
insurance is its ability to provide during unemployment an adequate
income to the unemployed.It is a fact of first-rate importance thatUNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 307
practically no extensive scheme of unemployment insurance has so far
met this test.Under the British plan those who are unemployed and
receive benefits are considerably better off than they were formerly,
but the benefits fall far short of any reasonable standard of adequacy.
During the history of the British scheme, the rates of benefit and the
periods for which benefits may be received have been changed frequently.
But the purpose of the change has not always been the same. When the
insurance fund was solvent and had accumulated a substantial surplus,
it was possible to raise rates in the attempt to keep pace with the rise
in the cost of living and even to raise the standards of benefit.But
when the surplus had been exhausted and the scheme faced a growing
deficit, the ruling consideration was no longer the standard of benefit,
but the solvency of the fund.Table XLIII shows the rates of benefit
for men and women during the whole history of the scheme from 1911
to the present, under both the unemployment insurance acts and the
system of out-of-work donations which practically replaced the insur-
ance acts in the year following the Armistice.
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Nov. 25, 1918—Dec. 12, 1918
Dec. 12, 1918—May 25, 1919
May 25, 1919—Nov. 25, 1919
Nov. 25, 1919—Mar. 31, 1921
Dec. 25, 1919—Nov.8, 1920
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a Thisamount was paid in this period to soldiers.
6Appliedto civilians receiving out-of-work donations.
Payments to civilians stopped on Nov. 24, 1919 but were continued at the rate
indicated for members of His Majesty's Forces until Mar. 31, 1921 whcn they came
under the provisions of the unemployment insurance acts.
dUnderthe Unemployed Worker's Dependants -(Temporary Provision) Act,
1921, an unemployed worker entitled to benefit under the principal acts receives,
after Nov. 10, 1921, in addition 5s. a week in respect of a wife or housekeeper, and is. a
week in respect of each dependent child.Under the out-of-work donation provisions,
also, supplementary allowances were made in respect of dependent children under
fifteen years of age at the rate of 6s. per week for the first child and 3s. for each other.
The insufficiency of these benefits, which amount to 1rpm one-fourth
to one-fifth of the average weekly wages of men and women in England,308 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
has been recognized from the very beginning.All of the acts and theii
amendments have, accordingly, contained provisions for the purpose ot
encouraging other agencies to add to the rates of benefit fixed under the
State schemes.Trade unions, benefit societies, individual employers,
and industrial councils have at one time or another been encouraged to
establish relations with the general scheme whereby the rates of benefit
could be increased through additions from these various sources.The
relations of trade unions and of other voluntary associations with the
general scheme are complicated and merit separate attention.In two
industries, however, voluntary action by individual firms, in one case,
and by the industry as a whole, in the other, has resulted in substantial
additions to the benefits there paid.
Of these plans the most interesting is that introduced by Rowntree
& Company, Ltd.It is, first of all, the purpose of the Rowntree plan
to increase the benefits to the extent that single men and women shall
receive 50 per cent of their regular earnings and married persons with
three children up to 75 per cent.In order to pay this benefit, the firm
has set aside £10,000 to found an unemployment fund and has agreed in
each year commencing with the year 1921 to set aside sums equal to
1 per cent of its wages bill in such year, until the fund reaches £50,000 or
5 per cent of the wages bill, whichever is the greater.Thereafter the
company will set aside annually such sums (not exceeding 1 per cent
of the wages bill) as are necessary to keep the fund up to the amount just
mentioned.The plan further p+ovides that those employed by Rowntree
must contribute to their trade unions at the rate of 2d. per week, for which
they receive on the average a benefit of 6s. per week.The unemployed
workman under this plan, therefore, will receive his benefit from the
general scheme, an additional benefit from the trade union, and a third
increment, sufficient to raise his total benefit to 50 or 75 per cent of his
average earnings, as the case may be, from the fund established by the
company.
A scheme that follows in practically all of its details the Rowntree
plan, even with regard to the rate of benefits paid, came into force in the
match manufacturing industry on April 15, 1921 and applied to the
wholethat industry.On December 15, 1920, Cadbury Brothers,
Ltd., of Birmingham, initiated a plan of insurance, supplementary to
the State scheme, wherein the firm deposited on that date a sum of
£5,000 and agreed to add annually thereafter an amount based upon a
flat rate payable per ton of the company's finished product.Out of
the insurance fund so established, the firm will add to the benefits pay-
able under the State scheme 22s. per week during the first six weeks of
unemployment and 1 is. during the second six, in the case of married
men and 16s. and 8s. •per week; respectively, in the case of single men
and women.Plans such' as these three are typical of the attempts toUNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 309
raise by outside funds the rates of benefit paid under the State scheme.
There may be other examples of experiments of this nature, but it is
reasonably certain that all such do not affect more than a very small
proportion of the working population of the country.The great bulk
of insured workers receive the State rates of benefit with the small bene-
fits added by trade unions and other voluntary associations.
With some minor exceptions, the State insurance schemes have
observed the principles of a flat rate of benefit.Little attempt has been
made to vary benefits in accordance with the needs or the normal earnings
of the beneficiary.In the out-of-work donations scheme different rates
of benefit were for the first time given to men and women and this practice
has been followed in the insurance acts of 1920, 1921, and 1922.The
out-of-work donations scheme, also, first recognized the factor of need by
providing additional allowances for dependent children.This measure
was later revived in the special act of November 8, 1921, which provided
for additional benefits in respect of dependent wife and children.Two
of the supplementary schemes, described above, carry the principle of
differentiation in benefits much further than they are carried under the
State scheme.In the plans conducted by the Rowntree company and by
the match industry, the benefit paid to a married man with three children
is considerably greater, for persons of the same level of earnings, than
that paid to unmarried men.Both plans depart, moreover, in another
important respect from the practice under the State scheme.The periods,
under the State scheme, for which benefits are allowed are determined
by general rules applicable to all alike.But by the terms
of these supplementary schemes, the period of benefit varies with the
length of service in the firm or industry of the particular beneficiary, so
that the periods of benefit run from 3 to 43 weeks as service in the firm
varies from 6 months to years.'
The Sources of Contributions to the Insurance Fundc—Contributions
to the insurance fund have from the outset come from three sources—
the employer, the employed, and the State.As in the case of benefits,
the insurance acts have always to the principle of flat rates,
with no variations in the rate of contribution because of differences in the
unemployment risk, either with regard to individuals, occupations, firms,
or industries.At the beginning, of course, such a differentiation would
have been fraught with great practical difficulties due to the lack of reliable
and extensive statistics of unemployment, essential for the computation
of the degree of risk.With the extension of the national scheme of
insurance in 1920 and alter a few years of the further collection of unem-
1Rowutree& Co., Ltd., Unemployment Benefit Scheme, Explanatory Memorandum,
p. 2; Joint Industrial Council of the Match Manufacturing Industry, Supplementary
Voluntary Unemployment Benefit Scheme, p. 6; Cadbury Bros., Ltd., Unemployment
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ployment statistics, some plan of premium rating should be not only
feasible but also, on the record, highly desirable.
Although the rates of contribution, or premiums, have not been graded
with reference to specific risks, the general level of the rates has been
changed several times during the life of the scheme.In each case the
change was made for the purpose of protecting the solvency of the fund.
Experience with the rates now prevailing has shown that they have failed
to serve this purpose both because of the wide incidence of unemploy-
ment and because of the increasing length of the spells of unemployment
and, hence, of the periods of benefit payment.Clearly an insurance fund,
not supported by a very large accumulated surplus, cannot survive a
proldnged and serious industrial depression and remain solvent without
the aid of additional subsidies or loans.When the rate of unemployment
begins to climb and continues to do so for a long period, it is as a practical
matter impossible to make, at the time, the necessary adjustments in the
premiums from employers and employees.There is apparently a working
level of contributions above which it would be hazardous to raise the rates.
From the outset the shares of the various contributors to the insurance
scheme have not been the same.As can be seen in Table XLIV, the
share of the State has varied from one-fourth to one-fifth of the total
contributions.This does not, however, account for the total expendi-
tures of the State on unemployment insurance.The cost of out-of-work
donations, which largely replaced the insurance payments from November,
1918 to November, 1919 and which paid benefits to soldiers and sailors
until about the middle of 1921, was completely borne by the State.The
scheme was altogether non-contributory.Furthermore, the State makes
annually substantial payments, in addition to its regular contributions,
for the cost of administering the scheme.In the last year, also, the
exhaustion of the surplus previously accumulated by the scheme has led to
substantial borrowings from the State.Beyond this, the differences in
the rates of contribution are slight and unimportant.
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Under the Act of 1921, (No. 1) Mar. 3, 1921, the rates fixed were lower than those given here;
but the new rates of July 4, 1921 were determined upon before the old rates had become effective.
6Underthe terms of the Unemployed Workers' Dependents (Temporary Provision) Act, effective
Nov. 7, 1921, employers, employees, and the 5tate pay additional premiums for men of 2d., 2d., and 3d.,
respectively, and for women, id., id., and 2d.The fund so collected is used as the source for benefits
in respect of dependent wives and children.UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 311
Itis, of course, not easy to weigh the relative burden of these contribu-
tions.For the workers the burden is clearly not excessive and amounts
to probably less than 1 per cent of their average earnings.The con-
tribution by the employers has been estimated to represent a bit more
than 1 per cent of their wages bill.'The state expenditures are even
more difficult to weigh in the balance because they are made to procure
conditions of well-being and states of mind—intangibles not reducible to
quantitative terms.So far as the contributions by employers are con-
cerned, it is not clear that they cannot be increased so as to permit the
payment of a somewhat higher rate of benefits.A few firms have
already voluntarily so increased their contributions, and there is no
indication that these firms enjoy peculiarly favorable conditions.It is
estimated by Rowntree that, during a period in which the rate of unem-
ployment was on the average 5 per cent, contributions by employers
of per cent of their wages bill in addition to contributions by
employees and the State substantially at their regular rates would yield
an insurance fund able to pay benefits ranging from 50 to 75 per cent
of the average earnings of the beneficiaries.2
The Definition of Unemployment.—It seems to be essential in any
system of insurance to define carefully the risk and to take measures
that will guard the insurance reserve against fraud, deception, or, in
general, an undue increase in the incidence of the risk.•So important
has this factor been in the insurance business that a substantial literature
has grown up concerned with the control of risks in the various branches
of insurance.Even in life insurance, which rests probably on the
soundest actuarial basis and where the risk would seem capable of
detection and definition beyond any reasonable question, elaborate
precautions are devised to ensure the payment of benefits only under
appropriate conditions.Thus from the time when a prospective policy-
holder makes application for his insurance until he actually receives his
insurance, he undergoes severe scrutiny designed to protect the company
and the other policy-holders.Purchasers of life insurance, for instance,
must receive a medical examination that establishes at the time their
physical fitness; they must testify concerning their family history; and
they must subscribe to a variety of conditions touching such diverse
matters as domicile and habits of life before they. can be admitted to
insurance.
The temptation to establish improper claims for benefit varies
markedly with conditions.Experience shows that life insurance com-
panies must exercise much greater care with applicants for very large
'ROWNTREE, B. SEEB0EM, Prevention and Compensation of Unemployment,
International Labor Review, December, 1921, p. 14.
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insurance than with those who wish to buy only a moderate amount.
In general the greater the prize, the greater seem to be the chances of
deception, deliberate or unconscious.Similarly, it is held and probably
with reason, that if the rate of unemployment benefit were placed too
high, people would prefer unemployment to work and the volume of
insured unemployment would rise to unprecedented heights, unless
effective measures of control were devised.Some risks, moreover, are
intrinsically difficult to define.Unemployment is a risk of this type.
The establishment of a system of unemployment insurance almost
universally gives rise to a host of problems relating to the definition and
control of unemployment, many of which are rarely foreseen.
When, therefore, the English government embarked on its scheme of
compulsory unemployment insurance in the Act of 1911, detailed pro-
visions were therein made for the preliminary definition of unemploy-
ment.Gradually as the system came into operation and accumulated
experience, thesefirststatutory provisions were supplemented by
administrative rules and orders, by rules of procedure, and by semi-
judicial interpretations which together represent the definition of unem-
ployment under the successive acts..Analysisof these many rules and
provisions shows that the definition of unemployment for insurance
purposes is, to a much greater degree than with other insurable risks, an
arbitrary matter, determined by prevailing industrial practices and
customs in the country where the scheme operates and by the financial
necessities of the particular situation.And this must necessarily be the
case.
Certain of the statutory provisions, which have been retained with
only minor amendments throughout the history of the scheme, are
financial in character and depend inpracticefor their effectiveness purely
on the efficiency of the accounting department of the scheme.Such
provisions limit the period of benefits, fix the proportion of benefits to
contributions, and establish a right to benefit only when the individual
has not exhausted his quota of the insurance fund.More interesting
and more difficult, however, are the statutory provisions which define
the conditions under which an applicant for benefit becomes and ceases
to be unemployed.
Before the Act of 1920 the number of trades to which the insurance
scheme applied was limited.There was frequently, therefore, the
necessity under the early acts of determining whether an applicant for
insurance was working in an insured trade.If he was not, he was ineli-
gible for benefit.The 1920 Act covered practically the whole of English
industry, but, as before, insurance is limited to "employed" persons,
possessing certain qualifications, working in the insured industries.Once
eligibility for insurance is established in accordance with these various
terms, the question of the legitimacy of the particular period of unemploy-UNEMPLO YMENT INSURANCE 313
mentbecomes important.On this matter statutory provision and
administrative practice have been so framed as to protect at the same
time the insurance scheme against malingering and the insured from
harsh and unjust measures of disqualification.
Protection against malingering is sought by providing that a workman
is disqualified for benefit if he lost employment through misconduct or
voluntarily left his employment without just cause; if he lost his last
employment by reason of a trade dispute; and if he refuses to accept
suitable employment.The workman, on the other hand, is protected
by the further provisions that he is not disqualified from benefit if he has
declined an offer of employment in a situation vacant as a result of a
stoppage of work due to a trade dispute; or an offer of employment in
the district where he was last employed at a rate of wages lower, or on
conditions less favorable, than those which he habitually obtained in
his usual employment; or an offer of employment in any other district
at a rate of wages, or on working conditions, below trade union standards
or the standards of good employers in such district.'
Simple as the terms of disqualification and of protection seem to be,
they have become in practice the subject of frequent controversy.Such
conceptions as "miscond,uct," "just cause," "suitable employment,"
"by reason of a trade dispute," "more or less favorable conditions,"
prevailing and standard rates of wages, have turned out to require
frequent interpretation in the light of particular conditions.To provide
for the interpretation of these provisions of the law, there has been set up
under the scheme an elaborate machinery of investigation, administra-
tion, and interpretation.Decision on the validity of a claim to benefit
is first made by a government agent, known as the insurance officer.He
decides in the first instance whether a claim shall be allowed and also
later whether the payment of benefit should be discontinued.In the
event that the claimant is satisfied with the decision of the insurance
officer, the case stops at that point.The claimant has, however, the
right of appeal to a Court of Referees, composed of representatives of the
workers and of the employers and an impartial chairman, when he is
dissatisfied with the decision of the insurance officer.Should the
decision of the Court of Referees affirm the decision of the insurance
officer, the case is closed.Where the Courts finds differently, however,
the claimant receives his benefit and will continue to do so unless the
insurance officer appeals from the decision of the Court to a species of
appelate court, known as the Umpire.The decision of the Umpire is in
all cases final, but cases may be reopened on the presentation of new facts.
In the decisions of the Umpire, a portion of which now fill more than
four thick volumes, such conceptions as "suitable employment" and
'All of these provisions of the insurance acts are as follows: Act of 1911, Sec. 86
and 87; Act of Sec, 7 S.314 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
the rest take on specific meaning.There is no more illuminating source
of information on the practicability of defining unemployment and on the
influence of industrial practice and custom in a country on the operation
of unemployment insurance, than the abstracts of the decisions of the
Umpire.Concerned at first largely with fixing the demarcation of
insured trades, the Umpire has gradually constructed a body of principles
and rules which give force to the provisions of the statutes.In one case,
for example, the Umpire held that a job offered eighty miles away from
the workingman's home, which the workingman did not accept because
he did not consider the work sufficiently attractive to warrant his leaving
home and a wife and two children, was not suitable employment.' A
large number of decisions hold that refusal to do extra work "outside
the contract of service"2 does not constitute leaving employment without
just cause and does not, therefore, disqualify the workman for benefit.
Misconduct, likewise, has been the subject of frequent interpretation.
Under this last subject alone there have been a very considerable number
of cases classified under such heads as, absence from work without leave,
disobedience to orders, personal conduct, bad time-keeping, and general
questions including among others such matters as misconduct out of
working hours, false representations in order to obtain employment, and
discharge for making disparaging remarks to customers about employers'
material.
A large number of cases have been brought before the Umpire through
requests by associations, such as trade unions, for refunds where members
of the associations had been disqualified from benefit for failure to take
suitable employment.In a number of interesting and important cases
the association held the proffered employment not suitable because
acceptance would conflict with the rules of the association.In one such
case, for instance, the Umpire held that "if the Society desire to main-
tain such a rule [against doing piece work] in circumstances such
as these where satisfactory earnings can be obtained, they alone must
bear the cost.It is not a case for assistance from the Unemployment
Fund."3
The determination of the loss of employment by reason of a trade
dispute and of the right of a workman to decline a situation vacant as a
result of a stoppage of work due to a trade dispute has occasioned con-
siderable difficulty and has given rise to many decisions.In a series of
very early cases, the task of the Umpire was to decide whether people
thrown out of work in the course of a trade dispute were engaged in
1Decisionsgiven by the Umpire respecting Claims toBenefit, Unemployment
Insurance, U. I. 440A, vol. 1, Case 43.
2Seefor instance, ibid., Case 5.
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"separate branches of work commonly carried on as separate businesses
in separate premises" and were therefore qualified to receive benefit.'
"This workman," said the Umpire in one of these cases, "appears to
have been engaged in work of a kind which is required at all tube factories
as a necessary part of the working of such factories.I do not think,
therefore, that he can be said to have been engaged in a separate branch
of work which is commonly carried on as a separate business in separate
premises."2Another group of cases fixes the status of people thrown
out of work as the result of strikes, but not themselves on strike.Thus
in two early cases, the Umpire said: "This workman lost his employment
by reason of a stoppage of work which was due to a trade dispute.There
was a dispute between the strikers and the non-strikers and the employer
of the non-strikers in connection with employment of all persons at the
factory at which this workman was employed."3The benefit was in
these cases disallowed. A significant finding of the loss of employment
through a stoppage in work due to a trade dispute is illustrated in the
case of an applicant for benefit who was in arrears with his contributions
to his association and was unable, on the demand of the branch secretary,
to pay them."The employer was informed that there would be a strike
of the masons employed by him unless the applicant were discharged
forthwith, and in order to prevent the threatened stoppage of work the
employer dismissed the applicant.It was contended that the applicant
did not lose his employment owing to a trade dispute, as he had no
difference whatever with his employer, who merely discharged him in
order to prevent unpleasantness with the other workmen. On the other
hand, it was pointed out that there was a trade dispute between work-
men and workmen at the premises, and that the applicant lost his employ-
ment on account of that dispute.The Court of Referees (Western Ire-
land District) were of opinion that there was no trade dispute within the
meaning of the Act, and accordingly recommended that the claim for
benefit should be allowed."The insurance officer declined to accept
the recommendation and the benefit was disallowed by the Umpire.4
In 1913 an analysis was made of the reasons for disallowance of
benefits in a certain proportion of the cases coming before the Courts of
Referees and the Umpire.The results of this analysis, which are shown
below, indicate the preponderance of disallowances because of misconduct
and leaving employment voluntarily without just cause.While the
materials for a similar analysis are not readily available subsequent to
1913, it is probable that the proportions have not varied considerably,
'Act of 1911, Sect 87 (1).
2Decisionsgiven by the Umpire respecting Claims toBenefit,Unemployment
Insurance, U. I. 440A, vol. 1, Case 90, also Cases 54, 79, and 92.
8Ibid.,Cases 88, 89, and 94.
3, Case 1309; vol. 1, Cases 304 and 370.316 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
with the difference, however, that after the war and the demobilization
of the war industries, disallowance for refusal to accept suitable employ-
ment bulked much larger in the total than before.This was particularly
the case with many women applicants for unemployment insurance
benefit during the latter period.
TABLE XLV.—REASONS OF DISALLOWANCEa








Insufficient contributions . 4.7 4.2
Notcapableof work























First Report on the Proceedings of the Board of Trade under Part II of the Na-
tional Insurance Act, 1911,Command6965, 1913, p. 33.
On the record, the task of defining unemployment and controlling
it within the statutory limits has been successfully accomplished by the
machinery of insurance officer, Court of Referees, and Umpire. An
important factor that has contributed to the working of this machinery
is the degree to which trade unionism and trade-union standards are
accepted in England.The practices and standards of organized workers
thus afford a measuring rod with reference to which adjustments can be
generally made.In the United States, just because the trade-union
practices and standards are not so completely accepted, the definition of
unemployment and the determination of suitable employment or mis-
conduct would, for a considerable period at least, encounter real obstacles.
In addition to the control exercised over unemployment by the
measures just considered, the public employment exchanges, in their
relation with the scheme of unemployment insurance, have played an
important part in the administration of the same elements of the insur-
ance acts.Organized in 1910, two years prior to the organization of
national unemployment insurance, the national public exchanges haveUNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 317
beenconstantly extended so that they might more effectively serve the
needs of the system of unemployment insurance.Indirectly their
service consists in facilitating the mobility of labor by finding all possible
and available vacancies and by referring the applicants for jobs to such
vacancies.While the employment exchanges have constantly been
exposed to severe criticism for failing to perform this function satisfactorily,
the evidence points to a large measure of efficiency in this regard.But
beyond this the employment exchanges are essential elements in the
administration of the scheme of unemployment insurance, since it is at
the exchange that the applicant for benefit lodges his unemployment book,
registers daily during his period of unemployment, is offered employment,
and receives his benefit.However defective the employment exchanges
may be in lending mobility to labor, even their critics agree that the
administration of unemployment insurance is impossible without them,
or at least an equally efficient substitute.For the time being no such
substitute has been produced.
Since the Armistice, November, 1918, the task of controlling unem-
ployment has been considerably more difficult than it was before.The
difficulties began on November 25, 1918, with the coming into effect on
that date of the out-of-work donation scheme.Prior to the Armistice,
the English government foresaw the problems which would attend the
demobilization of the armed forces of the country and of the civil war
workers.There was no time to extend the limits of the unemployment
insurance acts.So the plan was conceived of paying to members of His
Majesty's Forces and to civilians weekly benefits during prescribed
periods of unemployment.The scheme differed from the prevailing
system of unemployment insurance in that it covered a much greater
number of persons, it was non-contributory, and the level of benefits was
considerably higher than ever before.' At the same time, also, the shutting
down of war industries threw out of work many persons, particularly
women, who found it difficult, if not impossible, to get work under con-
ditions as satisfactory as those they had enjoyed during the war.This
plan had been in operation only a short time before it met with extensive
criticism as encouraging fraud and deception and imposing excessive
burdens on the country.The reply to the criticism was an elaborate
investigation of the scheme which concluded with a statement by the
investigating committee that ". .theevidence so far heard by us
indicated no grounds for supposing that there had been extensive fraudu-
lent abuse of the donation scheme. .2'The impression obtained,
however, that it was easy to get the donations.Changes were, therefore,
made in the administration of the. scheme.Among these changes was
that which gave to Local Employment Committees the right to issue
should be remembered, however, that the increase in benefits was accom-
panied, indeed preceded, by great increase8 in prices.318 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
additional donation policies only when they satisfied that the appli-
cant was normally in employment, genuinely seeking work, and unable
to obtain it.The effect of this change was indubitably to eliminate many
persons not eligible for benefit.1
Conditions similar to those obtaining under out-of-work donations
appeared also in the administration of the Acts of 1921.In these acts,
because of the great and increasing volume of unemployment, benefit
was made payable to large numbers of persons who had made few or no
contributions to the fund.Eligibility to benefit turned largely on the
applicants having been "normally in employment" and on their "gen-
uinely seeking whole-time employment."Again as before, there was a
feeling of laxity."The view has been expressed that in some cases
young men and women, not altogether dependent upon themselves for
maintenance, do in fact seek to avail themselves of benefit without
making any very serious effort to seek work; and have, indeed, refused
offers of employment for reasons which ought to involve forfeiture of
benefit."2The administrative machinery was, accordingly, kept in a
measure in the form which it assumed during out-of-work donations
by the retention of Local Employment Committees, with power to inquire
into such questions as normal employment and the genuine quest for
work.Instructions sent to these committees from the Ministry of
Labor are evidence of the difficulty of the problem of controlling employ-
ment and of the vigorous efforts made by the administration to prevent
the payment of improper claims.One instruction states, for instance,
that: "The mere fact that the applicant dislikes the employment
offered does not, in itself, make the employment unsuitable.There
must, in addition, be some satisfactory ground for the objection.For
example, if a woman who is prepared to accept day work as a domestic
servant objects to becoming a resident domestic servant, this is not, in
itself, a ground for holding that resident domestic service is not suitable
employment in her case; there must, in addition, be—for example—
some valid objection arising from her domestic ties."3In another place
the Ministry cautions the administration against a too great liberality
in allowing claims to benefit."The funds which accrue under the act
are contributed, as to four-fifths, by employers and employed persons,
and as to the final fifth by the State.The Minister and those who
1 Interim Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Scheme of Out-of-work
Donation, Command 196, 1919; Final Report of the same committee July 25, 1919.
Command 305, 1919; Decisions given by Umpire respecting claims to Out-of-work
Donations, U. I. 440B vol. 1, Prefatory Note, p. ii.
2 Circular letter from the Minister of Labor to the chairmen of Local Employment
Committees, Mar. 8, 1921.
General Memorandum for the Guidance of Local Employment Committees and
Officersof theMinistry of Labour (Unemployment Insurance Act, 1921) U. I. A.
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assist him are in the position of trustees for the contributors to the Fund.
Accordingly, however deserving an application may be in other respects,
and whatever sympathy the Committee may feel in the particular cir-
cumstances, they should . ..keepalways in mind the essential fact that
they are not administering a compassionate allowance, but that they are
administering benefit under a compulsory insurance act."1
It has been proposed from time to time that mobility of labor could
be increased and malingering more effectively controlled if the adminis-
tration of the payment of benefits and of the finding of jobs were
entrusted to agencies other than the employment exchanges.In many
cases trade unions already have their employment offices and vacancy
registers; they are in close touch with industrial conditions in the trades
in which their members work; and as a result of their knowledge of
industrialconditions they can the more easily and swiftly detect
malingering.From the beginning, indeed, a share of the administration
of the insurance acts, in this regard, has been assumed by trade unions and
other associations which met the conditions imposed first by the Board of
Trade and later by the Ministry of Labor.No data exist which make
possible an estimate of the relative merits of one or another system of
administration.There is a widespread feeling that such a decentraliza-
tion of administration in the hands of specialized industrial groups
doesinsomecases,atleast,bring superior administration.In
general, however,tradeunionsandotherassociations have not
worked out their placement problems so efficiently as to warrant a
wholesale transfer of administration from the State to these private
industrial agencies.
A plan of administration that is designed to protect the insurance
fund against improper claims and that is apparently working with marked
success is that embodied in the Rowntree scheme of supplementary
unemployment insurance.In the Rowntree scheme, the fund is admin-
istered by a committee appointed entirely by the workers.Furthermore,
while the firm guarantees the premiums under the scheme, it does not
guarantee benefits."If the scheme were abused, the premium might not
suffice to pay the benefits expected.Thus all the workers have an
interest in seeing that it is not abused, lest on their becoming unemployed
they should find the funds so depleted that they could not obtain their
full benefit."2This scheme has obviously much to recommend it; but
it must wait for more general adoption upon the assumption by employers
of a larger measure of responsibility toward the unemployed.
1GeneralMemorandum for the Guidance of Local Employment Committees (Unem-
ployment Insurance Act (No. 2)1921) U. I. A. 505A, p.4; Suitable Note on
the Application of Sec. 96 (provisos (b) andCc),to Women applicants, U. I. 445.
2ROWNTREE,B. SEEBORM: Prevention and Compensation of Unemployment,
International Labor Review, December, 1921, p. 13.320 BUSiNESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
The Prevention of Unemployment.—Advanced insurance practice
makes provision for the substantial reduction, if not the elimination, of
the risk against which persons insure themselves.These provisions as
a rule go much beyond the attempt merely to control the risk by
thepreventionofmalingering.They, in fact,consist in taking
the necessary steps to effect considerable and continuous reductions in
the risk.Even in life insurance, where, of course, the risk is not totally
preventable, a large degree of prevention is accomplished by measures
leading to the prolongation of life.Nearly every large life insurance
company today spends considerable sums on the education of its policy-
holders in the elementary facts of preventive medicine and personal
hygiene.In other fieldsof insurance the chances for almost total
prevention are good.The spread of fire insurance, for example, has been
followed by notable reductions in the loss of property through fires.
Much the same quality of record has been achieved, in a much briefer
period,under theinfluenceofaccidentinsuranceorworkmen's
compensation.
In the field of social insurance, prevention has come to be accom-
pushed by two devices that are commonly used together.The premium
under such schemes is paid not by the persons who suffer from the
particular hazard but by those who are, at the time, deemed to be respon-
sible for the hazard.Premiums, moreover, are not flat and equal for all
insured but are graded with reference to the degree of hazard.American
workmen's compensation systems are outstanding illustrations of the
type of insurance that combines both features.Under our compensation
legislation the premium is paid not by the workman who meets with an
industrial accident but by his employer and the employer with a bad
record of industrial accidents pays greater premiums than one with
fewer accidents.The insurance premium is, thus, conceived as a tax
or penalty which is designed to stimulate the employers to avail them-
selves of all possible means of prevention so that their premiums may be
reduced in proportion as their "experience" proves prevention to have
been successful.The application of this procedure to unemployment
insurance would produce a system in which the total premiums would be
paid by the employer and the premium rates would vary with the risk of
unemployment.
Preventive measures, of this type, have so far played little part in
the English unemployment insurance legislation.It is true that part
of the cost of the present scheme is borne by the employers but the burden
is in absolute amount not great and is not graded so as to penalize care-
lessness in the organization and use of the labor market.Prior to the
Act of 1920, the English scheme contained one provision designed to
regularize employment.This provision granted employers a refund of
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continuouslyin their service during that period and for whom not less
than forty-five contributions had been paid during the period.1The
refunds2 paid under this provision were:
1913—14 £113,106 1917—18 £117,034
1914—15 120,475 1918—19 137,242
1915—16 94,034 1919—20 117,391
1916—17 107,404
Inthe Act of 1920 this provision was abandoned and has not been again
enacted.Its net effect on the reduction of unemployment was negligible.
The germs of a plan of preventive unemployment insurance are to be
found in the "special schemes" provisions of the Act of The plan
originated, however, in a purpose quite distinct from that of prevention
at the time when it was contemplated to extend the Acts of 1911 and 1916
to cover the whole industrial population of England.There then devel-
oped considerable opposition to inclusion in the scheme of compulsory
unemployment insurance from industries which believed that their rate
of unemployment was considerably below that of the older insured
trades.4In order to placate the representatives of these industries, those
which were willing to subscribe to formulated in the Act of
1920 and by the Minister of Labor were allowed to "contract out," or in
other words to carry and administer their own unemployment insurance.
Those industries which elected to "contract out" were to receive a State
grant fixed at a maximum of 30 per cent of the normal rate, or one-tenth
of the contributions of employers and employees instead of the one-third
paid in respect of those remaining in the general scheme.The more
important conditions which industries were required to meet before
they were permitted to introduce special schemes, were that the insurance
would be more satisfactorily provided than under the general scheme;
benefits would be not less favorable; contributions would be regular and
sufficient to cover all costs without requiring special levies in bad times;
appropriate machinery of administration must be established.5If,
therefore, it turned out that an industry really had a lower rate of
unemployment, the cost of the insurance to the industry would be
1Actof 1911, Sec. 94 (1); see also for slight amendments to this provision, Act of
1914, Sec. 5, (1) and (2).
2Accountof the Unemployment Fund. .withthe Report of the Comptroller and
Auditor General thereon, each year.
Act of 1920, sec. 18.
For an interesting discussion of the attitude of these industries see Ministry of
Reconstruction, Second interim Report of the Civil War Workers' Committee, Report
of Sub-committee on Unemployment Insurance, Feb. 12, 1918, Command 9192, 1918.
Notes on Special Schemes and Supplementary Schemes for Industries (Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act, 1920) U. I. A. 2.Revised October, 1920.
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lower than under the general scheme and the benefits at least as high.'
Before many "special schemes" could be organized, the growing vol-
ume of unemployment made it necessary to suspend the right to
organize such schemes, on the general ground that, during the period of
insolvency of the insurance fund, industries with low unemployment
rates would help maintain the solvency of the fund.2No special industry
schemes can, accordingly, be set up from July 1, 1921 until the close of
the period of insolvency.Before the suspension, however, one such
scheme had already been put into operation in the insurance industry3
and another is under consideration for the banking industry.Neither
industryislarge,nor are the employees subject toconsiderable
unemployment.
The principle of the "special scheme," if it were applied throughout
the whole industry, might lead to measures for the prevention of unem-
ployment.The defect in the plan was, however, that it encouraged
"contracting out" only among those industries whose unemployment
record was already fair and left in the general scheme the "bad risks."
Upon the bad risks the general scheme imposes only moderately large
premiums, which in turn yield inadequate benefits, and the penalty or
tax on responsibility for excessive unemployment is lacking.Ten years
experience with compulsory insurance against unemployment in England
has not yet produced measures that have substantially affected the risk
of unemploythent.
The Solvency of the Insurance Fund.—An insurance fund, into which
contributions are paid and from which benefits are drawn, rests on actu-
arial estimates.Except in assessment insurance where assessments are
levied to meet current expenditure, the necessary size of the insurance
fund is estimated a considerable time ahead from more or less accurate
statistical materials.The same estimates, of course, also determine the
required rates of contribution and of benefit.The purpose of these pre-
liminary actuarial estimates is to find the rate of contribution that over a
considerable period of time will produce an insurance hind or reserve,
sufficient to yield the desired rate of benefit.In order, therefore, to
establish an insurance fund that will possess any elements of security, it
is essential to know beforehand the magnitude of the risk, the capacity
Reportby the Government Actuary on the Financial Provisions of the Bill (of 1919),
Dec.23, 1919, Command 498, 1919.
2Anotherreason for the suspension was, of course, that "all industries had had
their share of benefit and it was right that they should stay and make it good again
when employment became better."PHILLIPS, T. W., Work of the Employment and
Insurance Department of the British Ministry of Labour, Labour Gazette (Canada),
September, 1921, vol. XXI, p. 1179.
3IncorporatedInsurance Industry Unemployment Insurance Board, The Insur-
ance Industry Unemployment Insurance Scheme and Rules, 16 Russell. Square,
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ofthe insured to pay premiums, and the volume of benefits which it is
desired to draw from the insurance fund.To the extent that any
insurance scheme falls short of supplying such security, the insured will
be exposed to frequent changes in premiums, the beneficiaries to varia-
tions in their benefit, or the insurance fund to insolvency.Any or all of
these possible may indeed, as they frequently did, happen
at the same time.If, accordingly, it is desired that the insurance scheme
avoid the uncertainties that are normally associated with risks, such as
unemployment, the rate of benefit and the conditions of receiving it must
be at the outset carefully defined, the necessary rate of contributions
must be accurately estimated, and the rates and rules so decided upon
must be departed from only rarely.Such precision in estimating the
magnitude of risks is rarely possible.For this. reason it is the common
practice in many branches of insurance to include in the premiums a sub-
stantial margin of safety for the purpose of building up a surplus or
contingency reserve.
By the terms of the English unemployment insurance acts, the pay-
ment of benefits has always been limited by statutory provisions and the
necessary rates of contribution have been computed with reference to the
influence of these provisions.Thus the first act, that of 1911, limited
the payment of benefit to persons who could prove employment in
the insured trade in each of not less than twenty-six separate calendar
weeks in the preceding five years.' No benefit was paid at all during the
first six months of operation in order to enable the scheme to collect a
reserve.Unemployed persons under the act received no benefit during
a "waiting period" of one week.Benefits were not paid, even after the
"waiting period" had elapsed, during the whole period of unemployment
but were restricted to a maximum of fifteen weeks of benefit during the
year.And even then benefits were not paid whenever the number of
weeks' benefit received exceeded the proportion of one week's benefit for
every five contributions paid by the workman under the act.2With
minor modifications, the same or similar provisions were retained until
shortly after the Act of 1920 became operative when a series of new and
unanticipated conditions forced radical changes in procedure and, at the
same time, exerted a marked influence on the status of the insurance
fund.
The Act of 1920, effective November 8, 1920, extended the application
of compulsory unemployment insurance from less than 4,000,000 persons
to almost 12,000,000.As in the previous acts the maximum period of
benefit was placed at fifteen weeks; but the proportion of benefit to
contribution was changed from one to five to one to six, the waiting
period reduced to three days, and the insured was required to prove
'Sec. 86(1).
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that not less than twelve contributions had been paid in respect of him
under the act.'There were likely to be, however, a substantial number
of persons thrown out of work who had not had the opportunity to make
twelve contributions before their spell of unemployment began.The
status of such persons was met by the further provision of the Act of
1920 that insured persons who have paid four contributions shall receive
benefits for a maximum period of eight weeks during the first year of the
Act.2If the Act of 1920 had become effective during a period of only
moderate unemplOyment, it would probably have been unnecessary to
modify radically any of these provisions and the status of the insurance
fund would have been assured.But very soon after the close of 1920
there began in England, as elsewhere, that long and severe spell of
unemployment which played havoc with previous calculations and forced
the adoption of new practices.As the following table shows, average
unemployment of members of trade unions,3 during the year 1921, was
more than six times greater than in 1920; it rose to a peak about the
middle of 1921, then receded slightly and still remains more than seven
times as high as it was during the whole of 1920.While the table below
does not show the percentage of unemployment among insured persons,
because the available data for the latter are not strictly comparable with
the trade-union figures, the course of unemployment among insured was
much the same as among the trade unionists.Unemployment among
the insured likewise rose from 5.8 per cent in December, 1920 to 17.8
per cent in June, 1921. and was 14.4 per cent in April, 1922.
TABLE XLVI.—AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT OF TRADE UNION MEMBERS











































a Coal mining excluded owing to strike.
The effect of this prolonged spell of unemployment was, on the one
hand, to make it difficult for employed persons to pay their contributions
'Sec. 7, (1).
2Sec.44.This section was later repealed as from June 30, 1921.
Ministry of Labour, Labour Gazette, eachmonth.UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 325
and,on the other, to increase seriously the need of the unemployed
for benefit payments.Almost immediate action was taken, therefore,
to extend the periods of benefit and to wipe away some of the restrictions
on the right to receive benefits.The first of such measures was embodied
in the Unemployment Insurance (Temporary Provision Amendment)
Act, of 1920, which became effective December 25, 1920.This act sub-
stituted for the four contributions required in the Act of 1920, proof of
previous employment.There then came a rapid series of drastic amend-
ments of the Act of 1920 which, in order to meet the serious conditions
of unemployment, made the conditions of receiving benefit on the whole
considerably easier than they had been before.The one-in-six rule is
practically suspended.The waiting period is raised from three to six
days and the periods of maximum benefit are extended as indicated in
the next table.'










Act of 1921 (No. 1)...





Mar. 3, 1921—Nov.2, 1921 16 weeks
Nov. 3, 1921—July2, 1922 16 weeks
Adds maximum




Apr. 6, 1922—Oct. 31, 1922 15
Nov 1, 1922—June 30, 1923 12 weeks"
a Thesefifteen weeks of benefit are payable in three periods of five weeks each
separated by intervals of five weeks.When a person has received twenty-two weeks
benefit in all since Nov. 2, 1921, he is not entitled to benefit until April 17, next.
See Report of Government Actuary on the Financial Provisions of the Bill (of 1922),
Mar. 25, 1922, Command 1620, 1922; Memorandum on Unemployment insurance
Bill, Mar. 24, 1922, House of Commons Bill 62, 1922.
bTheMinister of Labor is empowered to grant two further periods of five weeks
each, making twenty-two in all.
All of these factors, then, were making for progressively larger and
larger drafts on the insurance fund, while the general state of business
1GeneralMemorandum for the Guidance of Local Employment Committees and Officers
of the Ministry of Labour (Unemployment Insurance Act, 1921), U. I. A. 505; General
Memorandum for the Guidance of Local Employment Committees (Unemployment
Insurance (No. 2) Act, 1921), U. I. A. 505A; Committee on National Expenditure,
First Interim Report, Command 1581, 1922, Appendix (A), pp. 149—53; Explanatory
Memorandum (Unemployment Insurance Acts, 1921), U. I. A., 518.326 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
depression and unemployment would not permit substantial assessments
on either employers or employed for the purpose of making good these
additional withdrawals.Even in periods of relatively moderate unem-
ployment, the suspension of the one-in-six rule and the limitation on the
benefit period would add appreciably to the expenditure for insurance.
The Government Actuary estimated, for instance, that the waiting week
and the limitation of benefits to fifteen weeks reduced the number of
"benefit days" to 71 per cent of the days of unemployment; while the
further limitation under the one-in-five (in the 1911 Act) rule reduced
the proportion to 64 per cent.'It is clear, therefore, that if such limita-
tions are not to apply or are suspended, the contributions must be propor-
tionately increased during the period of suspension unless the prevailing
rates of benefits are also proportionately lowered.
The most serious obstacle in the way of preserving the solvency of an
unemployment fund consists in the difficulty of predicting the frequency
and duration of extreme business depressions with their widespread
unemployment.From 1912 to early 1921 the insurance fund was in such
a favorable situation that not only had it met all of its obligations but
there had in addition been accumulated a surplus of more than £20,000,000.
This condition of prosperity was, of course, a reflection of good business
conditions and of steady employment.Table XLVIII shows how in a
fairly long period of steady employment, the amount spent on unemploy-
ment benefit was so moderate as to permit the accumulation of a surplus.
By the end of 1918 unemployment began to mount and continued upward
through part of 1919.The effect of this rise in unemployment is hardly
discernable in the expenditures for unemployment benefit in 1919 because
from November, 1918 to November, 1919, the unemployment insurance
acts were largely suspended,2 while unemployed civilians drew benefits
under the out-of-work donations scheme.This scheme, as said above,
was entirely non-contributory.By means of it, the government paid
in out-of-work donations to ex-service men £40,000,000 and to civilians
1Reportby the Government Actuary on the Financial Provisions of the Bill (of 1919),
Command 498, 1919, p. 7.The further important estimate is here made that "the
several limitations proposed will restrict the benefit days to a figure between 60 per
cent in periods of good trade when spells of unemployment are relatively short as
well as relatively few, and 70 per cent in periods of bad trade when the contrary con-
ditions prevail."
2"Forthe year 1919—1920 the Unemployment Fund was advantageously affected
by the benefits granted under the Scheme for Out-of-work Donation in operation as
regards ex-members of His Majesty's Forces for the whole period and as regards civil-
ians to November 30, 1919.These benefits were greater than and not payable concur-
rently with, those under Unemployment Insurance; the payment of benefit normally
chargeable to the Fund to a great extent ceased, and the Fund continued to accumu-
late during the year."Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Feb. 23,
1922 in Account of the Unemployment Fund, 1919—1920, House of Commons Paper
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TABLEXLVIII.—ExnwInTunEs FOR UNEMPLOYMENP
a Ministryof Labour, Labour Gazette,
to the suspension of the Unemployment
1919, strictly comparable figures with the
Account of the Unemployment Fund.
Auditor General thereon, each year.Figures
together the unemployment benefits paid to
lieu of unemployment benefit.
January, 1919, vol. XXVII, p. 2.Owing
Insurance Acts, during the greater part of
other years are not available.
with the Report of the Comptroller and
in this column are obtained by adding
workmen and refunds to associations in
£22,000,000 making a total of £62,000,000.'This amount, of course,
does not enter into the insurance accounting, but it represents the sum
spent in bridging over the first post-war crisis of unemployment.
The crash which came in 1921, however, was even greater and, as it
has turned out, more expensive.This time the insurance fund was not
helped by out-of-work donations but had to stand itself the great drain
from the rising tide of unemployment.In March, 1921, the surplus of
£20,000,000, which had been before then treated as a capital fund, was
made available to be spent currently.By the end of June, 1921 most of
the £20,000,000 was gone.Under the Act of 1921 (No. 1) the fund had
been empowered to borrow from the Treasury £10,000,000.This
amount was increased by the Act of 1921 (No. 2) to £20,000,000 and
again further increased by the Act of 1922 to £30,000,000.For the insur-
anee year 192 1—1922, it is estimated that the amount payable in unemploy-
ment benefit exceeds £46,000,000.This expenditureis covered by
estimated contributions amounting to only £33,270,000, thus leaving a
deficit at the close of 1921—1922 of almost £14,000,000.2Estimates
1PHILLIPS, T. W., Work of the Employment and Insurance Department of the
British Ministry of Labour, Labour Gazette (Canada),September, 1921, vol. XXI,
p. 1175.
2Reportby the Government Actuary on the Financial Provisions of the Bill (No. 2 of
1921),June 8, 1921, Command 1336, 1921.
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moreover, for the period of fifteen months from April 6, 1922 to July 1,
1923 place the payment for benefits in that time at £60,000,000 and the
total debt to the Treasury on July 1, 1923 at £27,000,000.1In little
more than two years, therefore, adverse conditions, largely unpredictable,
have converted a surplus of £20,000,000 into a deficiency of almost
£30,000,000.
Data such as these are interesting and important not only as revealing
the magnitude of the charge of unemployment insurance, but also for
the light they throw on the fundamental difficulty of predicting the turn
in the business cycle.When, for example, the Government Actuary
made his first estimate, on June 8, 1921, of the probable income and
expenditure of the fund during the year 1922—1923, he concluded that
contributions would yield £35,000,000, expenditures would amount to
£20,000,000, and there would accordingly be on June 1, 1923 a surplus
of £15,000,000.In arriving at this estimate he assumed an average
unemployment in the year 1921—1922 of 1,250,000 persons and in the
year 1922—1923 an approximation to normal unemployment, together
with the restoration of the restrictions on the payment of benefit con-
tained in the Act of 1920.2Less than a year later estimates for the same
periods are based on the assumptions that up to the end of June, 1922
unemployment will not exceed on the average 1,900,000 persons and that
during the twelve months following June, 1922 the average number of
insured persons unemployed will not be more than By that
time, too, it was known that the limitations on the right to benefit were
not only not restored but their suspension was extended to June 30, 1923.
Consequently the revised estimates show not a surplus on July 1, 1923
but a substantial deficiency and the duration of the deficiency period
becomes highly uncertain."The proposed rates of benefit," wrote the
Government Actuary on March 25, 1922, "are to continue during the
deficiency period and it may be presumed that with a continuous improve-
ment in the industrial position this debt will be steadily reduced.The
rate at which the debt will be repaid must, of course, depend upon the
course of unemployment and the conditions governing the receipt of
1 Report of Government Actuary on the Financial Provisions of the Bill (of 1922)
Mar. 25, 1922, Command 1620, 1922.
2 The comments of the Actuary on these estimates are interesting."It is impos-
sible," he writes, "to suggest any close figure with reference to the probable expendi-
ture on benefits.Even under normal conditions there is a wide fluctuation in the
claims from year to year as the trade cycle pursues its course, and to estimate merely
on the average of a trade cycle would give a figure which is meaningless in regard to
a particular year, though it may be properly used with reference to the operation to
the scheme when viewed over a series of years."Report by the Government Actuary on
the Financial Provisions of the Bill (No. 2 of 1921), Command 1336, 1921.
Memorandum on the Unemployment Insurance Bill, Mar. 24, 1922, House of
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benefit,but so far as can be seen at present, it is unlikely that the fund
will become solvent until several years after July, 1923."l
The evidence is overwhelming that the greatest obstacle to successful
unemployment insurance, of any type, lies in our inability to forecast the
length of successive phases of the business cycle.As long as this inability
continues, systems of unemployment insurance will be confronted more
or less frequently with sudden catastrophes, in the form of widespread and
enduring unemployment, against which they will be forced to take hasty
and incomplete measures.Indirectly, also, the experience of the English
scheme testifies to the absolute necessity of building adequate insurance
funds when business is on the up-swing.When business is in depression,
the need for benefit is great and the ability to pay low.It then becomes
necessary to vary the rates of contributions and of benefit, to obtain
subsidies from the outside, and the insurance scheme begins to become
almost as uncertain as the hazard it is designed to insure against.Greater
certainty can come only from a iiiore adequate statistical basis for the
forecast of unemployment and from an insurance fund accumulated at a
time when substantial contributions are not so difficult to get as they are
at present.2
The Encouragement of Voluntary Insurance.—-Trade unions and
voluntary associations of workmen, of one type or another, have for a
long time played a prominent part in English economic life.One of the
functions which many such associations have exercised is the payment to
their members of unemployment benefit.The passage of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act of 1911, therefore, found a substantial number of
workmen already in receipt of unemployment benefits of greater or
smaller amounts.It was• deemed highly desirable, in the first place,
that such associations as did pay benefits should not discontinue their
payment, since the statutory rate of benefit was notoriously too low.
Secondly, it seemed equally desirable to avoid any unnecessary duplica-
tion in the machinery of benefit payment.The Act of 1911, accordingly,
contained provisions3 which made it possible for associations, which met
certain conditions to the satisfaction of the Board of Trade, to assume
1Reportof the Government Actuary on the Financial Provisions of the Bill (of 1922),
Command 1620, 1922.
2Foran Illuminating discussion of this point see Report by Government Actuary on
the Financial Provisions of the Bill (of 1919), Command 498, 1919, p. 8.His conclud-
ing remarks on the nature of the risk of unemployment are particularly pertinent in
this connection."It is obviously impossible to predict the course of the trade cycle
or to measure the extremes in the rate of unemployment which will be touched in its
progress; in this respect the Fund is subject to contingencies, such as do not operate
in any other sphere of insurance, and while for practical purposes the average condi-
tions alone can be investigated, it is clear that the resulting surplus is not of the same
dependable character as the surplus found on the valuation of a life assurance com-
pany or even of a friendly society.."
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the payment of the "public" benefit as well as their own.Where this
was done, the members of associations, "in lieu of being concerned with
two sets of rules as to benefit, and in lieu of attending at the office of the
association to draw money on account of the association and at the
Local Office of the Unemployment Fund to draw state benefit, may
get a single combined benefit from their association."1The pay-
ment of benefit in addition to that furnished by the State was, more-
over, assured by the rule that associations could not recover from the
unemployment fund more than three-fourths of what they had them-
selves paid out.This meant that, in order to recover from the State
an amount equal to the SCate benefit of 7s., the association had to add an
amount of not less than 2s. 4d. for each week of unemployment.Asso-
ciations subscribing to these rules, then, assumed a share of the adminis-
tration of the scheme of unemployment insurance and paid to their
members something over and above their State benefits.
The Act of 1911, unlike that of 1920, covered only a relatively small
proportion of the working population of England.Probably as many as
9,000,000 employed persons were excluded from the recepit of unemploy-
ment benefit.The purpose of this early limitation of the scope of the
scheme was to permit experimentation in those trades which seemed at
the time to need unemployment benefit most, before applying the plan
universally.At the same time, however, it was deemed advisable to
encourage where possible the payment of benefits in the uninsured trades
and the increase of benefits, above the statutory rates, in the insured trades.
There was consequently embodied in the Act of 1911 the provisionZ
for a species of subsidy to all associations, whether in the insured trades3 or
not.Under these provisions, the Board of Trade was empowered to make
arrangements with an association whereby the government agreed to pay
part of what the association had spent in the preceding year for unemploy-
ment benefit.The share of the government was, however, in no case to
exceed one-sixth of the aggregate amount so spent by the association.
Where, moreover, the rate of benefit paid by the association was more
than 12s. a week, the amount in excess of 12s. was excluded in comput-
ing the State's share.The moneys spent in providing this State sub-
vention came not from the unemployment fund, but from an independent
parliamentary grant.
Both of these sets of provisions were retained substantially in their
original form until the Act of 1920.Since that Act extended the opera-
tion of compulsory insurance over practically the whole industrial work-
'First Report on the Proceedings of the Board of Trade under Part II of the National
Insurance Act, 1911, Command 6965, 1913, p. 6, paragraph 41.
2Sec. 106.
Where associations in the insured trades claim refund under Sec. 106, the refumd
is calculated on the expenditure of the association after the deduction of any sums
recovered by it from the unemployment fund under the provisions of Sec. 105.UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 331
ingpopulation, the latter section, providing partly for subventions to
uninsured trades, was dropped.The provisions for administration by
associations, however, and for the refund of part of their payments of
benefit to their members were retained almost in the same form in which
they appeared in the first act.'
The effects of these provisions in encouraging the growth of voluntary
unemployment insurance are hard to estimate.During the first year
of the operation of the scheme, 105 associations with an estimated mem-
bership of 539,775 availed themselves of the opportunity of making
arrangements under section 105.Under section 106 by the end of the
first year, 275 associations with an estimated membership of 1,104,223
had been admitted as satisfying the conditions of the Board of Trade.
Of these 275 associations, 103 with a total membership of 728,182 and a
membership in the insured trades of 53S,045 had made arrangements
under section 105 as well.In addition, 343 associations with an esti-
mated membership of 1,259,846 had by July 12, 1913, given notice of
intention to claim subvention under the provisions of sectiOn 106.2The
first effect clearly of the provisions of the scheme was to stimulate the
payment to voluntary insurance and to encourage associations to assume
a part of the administration of the scheme.The following table, for
the period in which the data are available, shows the amount of benefit
paid directly, to associations under section 105, and to associations
TABLE XLIX.—BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTIONS 105AND 106
Benefitspaid Refunds under Refunds under Year directa section105a section 10Gb
1912—13 £183,193 £25,124 £
1913—14 364,555 166,037 15,167
1914—15 249,532 169,168 114,593
1915—16 39,972 38,997 50,658
1916—17 24,133 10,175 13,736
1917—18 75,128 11,024 18,270
1918—19 148,881 3,839 7,586
1919—20 869,424 139,701 1,678
0Account.of the Unemployment Fund . ..withthe Report of the Comptroller and
Auditor General thereon, eachyear.
bCivilServices and Revenue Departments,Appropriation Accounts, each year.
1SeeAct of 1920, sec. 17.This section provides that payment by associations
to members must exceed the "public" rate of benefit by at least one-third of the
amount of that benefit.In the Act of 1921 (No. 1) this provision was amendedso
that the payment by associations to members would exceed the "public" rate of
benefit by at least 5s. per week for men, 4s. for women, 2s. 6d. for boys, and 2s. for girls.
2First Report on the Proceedings of the Board of Trade under Part II of the National
Insurance Act, 1911,Command 6965, 1913, p. 15.332 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
under section 106.After 1920, with the repeal of section 106, refunds
to associations were made under provisions laid down in the section (17)
that in the Act of 1920 replaced section 105.The continuous record of
the refunds in 1920 and 1921 under this section are not available, but it
is stated that in 1921, 193 associations with a membership of 2,110,000
were participating in the scheme under the section.'
The fear that the adoption of public insurance would discourage the
payment of unemployment benefits by trade unions and the few other
voluntary associations, which had been accustomed to pay such benefits
in the past, was found to be apparently unwarranted.While the
scheme of unemployment insurance did not have the effect of stimulating
a notable increase in the volume of benefits paid by associations, it also
did not lead such associations to abandon their provisions for the pay-
ment of unemployment benefits.The following statistics on the unem-
ployment benefits2 paid by trade unions reporting to the Registrar of
Friendly Societies show that the volume of benefits has varied with
changes in the membership of trade unions and in the rate of unemploy-
ment.In the past few years, as the tide of unemployment has risen so
sharply, the volume of benefits paid by trade unions grew considerably
and is stated to have reached in the year ending September, 1921, for
154 reporting unions, the sum of
TABLE L.—UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS PAID BY TRADE UNIorcs























An important, ifindirect, effect of these attempts to encourage
voluntary insurance has been to draw associations, particularly trade
unions, into the administration of the scheme of insurance.But this has
not been accomplished without friction.In the period in which unem-
ployment was small and the scope of the act restricted, relations were
easy and peaceful.After 1920, however, there came first the enormous
increase in the number of insured and later the rise in unemployment.
1PHILLIPS,T. W., Work of the Employment and Insurance Department of the
British Ministry of Labour, Labour Gazette (Canada), September, 1921, p. 1177.
2Annual Reports of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies for the Year ending,
December 51st .. PartC, Trade Unions.Number of registered unions reporting
Unemployed, Travelling and Emigration Benefits: 1911, 346; 1912, 358; 1913, 350;
1917,294, 1918, 293; other years not available.
'The New Statesman, Dec.24, 1921,vol. XVIII, p.339.*UNEMPLOYMENTINSURANCE 333
The extension of the act produced at once ill feeling between the trade
unions and the friendly societies.The trade unions were jealous of their
position and the friendly societies feared that the unemployment scheme
and its administrative machinery would swallow up the administration
of health insurance and their place in that administration.They,
therefore, demanded the right to exercise the same functions under the
unemployment scheme as were exercised by the trade unions.'When,
however, this right was finally granted them, most of them apparently
found their duties too onerous and the drain on their finances too great,
and did not avail themselves of it.The trade unions, likewise, during
the period of prolonged unemployment grew restless under the burden of
mounting costs of administration and were granted in addition to the
normal refund a subsidy for administration of ls. for every week's benefit
paid by them.2In spite of these manifestations, which are in some
measure reactions to the severe depression and its prolonged unemploy-
ment, the influence of the system of public insurance has been wholesome
both in stimulating the payment of benefits and in spreading the responsi-
bility of administration.
Problems of Administration.—The employment exchange is the most
important element in the machinery of administration of a system of
unemployment insurance.By means of the exchange, it is designed to
decrease the period of waiting between jobs, to assist the less organized
workers to find jobs, to enable the government to measure the volume of
unemployment, and to operate the scheme of compulsory insurance.
The development of the English system of employment exchanges has
been practically synchronous with the growth of the scheme of insurance.
Every extension of the system of insurance, as well as unfavorable condi-
tions of employment, have thrown additional burdens on the exchanges.
From the beginning the exchanges have been subjected to severe criticism
on many grounds.They were too expensive.Most jobs were found by
persons independent of the exchanges.They had not earned the good
will of the employers and the trade unions.They were resorted to
largely by unskilled workers and were not used by the skilled.
It is doubtful, however, whether the criticism stands the test of actual
performance of the English system of public employment exchanges.
The system necessarily had to undergo a period of scrutiny in which the
attitudes of the exchanges towards trade unions and employers were
closely watched.They were forced to meet extremely difficult emergency
conditions at the outbreak of the war, with the extension of insurance in
'National Federation of Employees' Approved Societies, Report of the Special
General Meeting and the Annual General Meeting, London, Oct. 12, 1920; Association
of British Chambers of Commerce, Report of Meeting of Representatives of Chambers
of Commerce, 14 Queen Anne's Gate, Jan. 12, 1921.
2TheNew Statesman, Dec. 24, 1921, vol. XVIII, p. 339.334 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
1916, in the administration of out-of-work donations in 1918 and 1919,
and during the present severe crisis.From 1910 to 1920 the staff of
the exchanges increased in number from 528 to roughly 13,000 persons,
with a maximum on June 7, 1919 to 21,331.1In the interval, also, from
1911 to 1019 the number of registrations for jobs increased from 1,066,000
to 5,929,000, and the number of vacancies notified from 608,000 to 1,259,-
000.2The coming into effect in November, 1918 of the scheme of out-
of-work donations threw a heavy additional burden on the exchanges.
Both in 1919 and in 1920 the employment exchanges were made the
subject of critical and competent investigations by special committees
appointed for that purpose.In both cases the evidence is overwhelming
that the exchanges performed their function with notable success.Most
of the charges were found to have little foundation infact.The
exchanges were utilized on a very large scale by employers and by trade
unions.Statistical records indicate that they were used extensively by
skilled workers.While there was considerable room for greater coopera-
tion with employers and while, there was some discussion of making
the notification of vacancies compulsory on employers, no change in this
direction was finally recommended.In the administration of the insur-
ance scheme, the evidence was conclusive that the exchanges played an
essential part in protecting the unemployment fund by recommending
to unemployed insured persons suitable employment.Through their
method of local and divisional organization, their labor control section,
and their machinery for notifying vacancies and applications from one
district to another, they seemed tQ be gradually approximating as
complete a control over the mobility of labor as can in practice be
achieved.
It is, however, on the score of excessive cost that the whole scheme
of unemployment insurance has been most severely attacked.The
great increase of the tax burden in England during and after the war has
led there, as elsewhere, to the examination of those functions which are
deemed either too wasteful in themselves or wastefully administered.
No absolute standards exist, of course, by which it is feasible to measure
the waste or profit involved in the cost of administering an extensive
system of compulsory unemployment insurance.The table below shows
the total cost of administration of the scheme and the contributions
1Minutesof Evidence Taken before the Committee of Enquiry into the Work of the
Employment Exchanges, Command 1140, 1921, p. 11.
2Ibid.,Appendix 3, p. 434.
Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Committee of Enquiry into the Work of the
Employment Exchanges, Command 1140, 1921; Minutes of Evidence Taken before
Committee of Inquiry into the Scheme of Out-of-work Donations, Command 407, 1919.
See particularly the testimony of T. W. Phillips, Assistant Secretary, Employment
Department, Ministry of Labor, and of Commander J. B. Adams, General Manager,
Employment Department, Ministry of Labor.UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 335
paid by the government into the unemployment fund.'It does not,
however, include the expenditure of more than £60,000,000 on outeofe
work donations from 1918 to 1921, or the somewhat less than £30,000,000
which will have been borrowed from the government for the unemploy-
ment fund by June 30, 1923.The administrative expenses were in fact
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larger than are indicated in the table, but a substantial proportion of them
was borne by segregating from the government contribution to the unem-
ployment fund a percentage for use in meeting the cost of administration.
This percentage is included in the figures in the third column of the
table, so that the total charge of the unemployment scheme on the
government is properly represented in the final column.
With a view to suggesting savings in the cost of administration,
the Government Actuary made in December, 1921 a report on the
expenses of administration and recommendations for their reduction.2
The most important of his recommendations was that there be sub-
stituted a single contribution card for the two cards now held by persons
insured in the schemes both of health and of unemployment insurance.
This practice, it is pointed out, means that the contribution record of
each of 12,000,000 people under unemployment insurance is practically
duplicated under health insurance.The suggestion is one that has been
made before, but it has always been rejected, probably because it is
still considered the sounder public policy to permit each scheme, for the
time at least, to retain its identity.An Interdepartmental Committee
appointed "to consider the relations of Health Insurance and Unemploy-
1Committeeon National Expenditure, First Interim Report, Command 1581, 1922,
p. 145.
2Ibid.,Appendix (B), pp. 153—60.336 BUSINESSCYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
ment Insurance" reported on March 17, 1922 that "whatever may be
our ultimate recommendation, it is not possible to bring a combined
card into use so soon as next July." when the unemployment books and
the health insurance cards now in use expire.
In addition tothisduplicationinadministration between the
schemes of health and unemployment insurance, the system of unemploy-
ment insurance has used an administrative and accounting procedure
that has been often regarded as too cumbersome and expensive.This
procedure has originated not in any peculiar principles of administration
but in what have seemed to be the requirements of sound insurance
practice.Thus the rule restricting the payment of benefits to one week's
benefit for every six contributions, or the "one4n-six rule," has imposed
on the administration of the system the necessity of keeping a vast
number of individual records of the payment of contributions and of
benefits.The expense of maintaining these records is undeniably great.
But the method by which the administration may be simplified is not
clear.A suggestion by the Government Actuary that the claims of
individuals for benefits be controlled by reference to their "general
employment records" seems to raise more serious difficulties than it
settles.Other proposals for drastic administrative simplification seem,
likewise, to create new problems where old ones existed before.2Reform
in administration, when it does come, will come slowly and experimen-
tally and will be made with due regard, not only for cost, but also for the
purposes of the scheme.
UI. AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS WITH UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
American experience with unemployment insurance is more important
for its promise than for its accomplishment.As in many other fields of
social legislation, in this, too, the United States has followed slowly and
reluctantly the steps of other countries.Until rather recently, this
country treated unemployment and the unemployed with measures that
are known to have outlived their usefulness.There were the hastily
improvised schemes designed to solve the problem of depression unem-
ployment.Contracts were let hurriedly for public work.Charity facil-
ities were extended.Employers were encouraged to divide the work
among all their employees.At about that point the activities of the
community stopped.Within less than a decade, however, there have
been carried on a few experiments in unemployment insurance in the
United States that command consideration.While these experiments
affect only an insignificant proportion of the whole working force of the
'Interdepartmental Committee on Health and Unemployment Insurance, First
andSecondInterim Reports, Mar. 17, 1922, Command 1644, 1922, p. 10.
2Committeeon National Expenditure, First Interim Report, Command 1581, 1922,
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country, they have in them the germs of effective measures for attack-
ing unemployment through the medium of insurance.Unemployment
insurance or compensation, as it has been called in this country, has
developed in the form of establishment funds, of an industrial fund
confined to one city, and of proposed legislation by three American
commonwealths.
The best known examples of the establishment fund are those organ-
ized under the auspices of Deering, Milliken company in the Rockland
Finishing Company at West Haverstraw, New York, and in the Dutch-
ess Bleachery, Inc. at Wappinger Falls, New York, and by the Dennison
Manufacturing Company at Framingham, Mass.In the three instances,
the fund is set aside by the companies out of their profits.Once estab-
lished, the funds are administered either by a committee of workers, as
in the first two cases or by a joint committee of workers' and employers'
representatives as in the last.What constitutes unemployment, under
the administration of the fund, is in each case defined with precision and
detail and benefits range from 50 to 90 per cent of their normal wages.1
In their main features, although not in their details, these provisions for
unemployment insurance are quite similar to those made by the Rown-
tree and Cadbury firms in England to supplement for their employees
the benefits from the State fund.
A sum of $20,000, set aside by the directors of the company in 1916,
was the beginning of the unemployment fund maintained by the Denni-
son Manufacturing Company.Additional sums were appropriated for
the same purpose in 1917, 1918, and 1919.The articles governing the
control and use of the fund were drafted in 1920.The accounts of
expenditures from the fund in the past few years bear testimony to the
degree to which this firm has been able to reduce the volume of unem-
ployment.Tn 1920 the amount of unemployment compensation was
$4,490; in 1921 it was $22,989; and in the first six months of 1922 only
$95.For both 1920 and 1921 the amount of unemployment compensation
represented less than 1 per cent of its total pay-roll.At the Dutchess
Bleachery and at the Rockland Finishing Company the volume of unem-
ployment compensation seems to have run relatively higher than at the
Dennison Manufacturing Company. The expenditures of the first
establishment were $15,875 in 1920 and $11,973 in 1921, or on the aver-
age 2 per cent of the total pay-roll; and those of the second establishment
were $59,512 and $27,660 in 1920 and 1921, respectively, or on the aver-
age about 3.75 per cent of the total pay-roll.
While these experiments in unemployment compensation have not
been generally and extensively adopted, they have been received with con-
1Forthe details of these schemes see Experience of American Employers Favorable
to Unemployment Compensation (reprint from American Labor Legislation Review,
March, 1921, vol. XI,No.1), pp. 3, 9.
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siderable interest.Only in. the past few months a group of manufacturers
in Philadelphia, engaged in the manufacture of box-making machinery,
locks and hardware, leather belting, and electric measuring instruments,
has been studying proposals for the initiation of similar unemployment
compensation funds.The tentative plan on which this group is working
provides for the establishment of an unemployment compensation fund by
the firm; it limits the liability of the firm for the payment of compensation
to the fund itself; after the manner of the British scheme it proposes
safeguards to protect the fund against malingering; the rate of benefits
it proposes is 50 per cent of normal wages in the case of unmarried persons
and 75 per cent for a married man with a wife and three children.At
this writing the proposal is still in the state of discussion.1
An unemployment insurance fund which has quite a different origin
was created in Cleveland in June, 1921 as a part of a collective agreement
between the local branch of the International Ladies Garment Workers'
Union and the manufacturers of women's clothes in that city.This
agreement requires each manufacturer to guarantee his regular workers
twenty weeks of employment in each six months.If the employer fails
to provide this amount of unemployment, he must pay his employees
during the unemployed part of the period, two-thirds of their minimum
wages.Since this agreement became effective when employment was
particularly low in the industry, the liability of the manufacturers for
unemployment pay was limited to percent of their total direct labor
pay-roll during each period of six months.These funds laid aside by
each employer, and deposited weekly at the office of the impartial chair-
man of the industry, are not thrown into a common pool but are kept
separate.At the end of each six months, therefore, such employers as
have not had their complete fund drawn receive refunds of their balances.2
'On Jan.1,1922 the Delaware and Hudson Co. put into effect a compre.
hensive scheme of insurance, insuring their employees against death, accident and
siëkness, dismemberment or death by accident, old age and unemployment.The
terms under which an employee receives unemployment insurance are as follows:
"Provided he applies for and keeps in force at least two of the three classes of
insurance (Life, Health, and Accident)—the Delaware and Hudson Co. will under-
take to insure the employee against unemployment resulting from dismissal for any
cause—the entire cost to be borne by the company.The amount of such insurance
shall be $15 per week for a period not to exceed six weeks, or for so much of that time
as the employee is unable to find employment except that employees whose average
annual wages during the preceding two years of continuous service have not been
more than $1,000 will be paid $10 per week for the same period."
2 MAcK, W. .1., Safeguarding Employment: The "Cleveland Plan" of TJnemploy-
ment Compensation: AmericanLaborLegislation Review, March, 1922, vol. XII,No.1,
p. 25.In a decision of the Board of Arbitration, May 16, 1922, the manufacturers
who avail themselves of a reduction in wages are required to raise their minimum
weekly guaranty fund payment from 7)4 to 25 per cent of their total pay-roll and to
pay benefits at the rate of the full minimum wage instead of two-thirds the minimum,
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kn incentive is thus presumably given to employers to regularize their
business and to save the payment of unemployment benefit.
The interpretation of the experience of the first six months, from June
bo December, 1921, with this system of unemployment insurance in
Cleveland is made difficult by the character of the ladies' garment
industry.In Cleveland, as elsewhere, the industry is divided into two
branches, the inside shops, generally of substantial size, and the outside
shops of small size operated by contractors.An analysis of contribu-
tions to and expenditures from the insurance fund indicate a much
greater regularity of employment in the inside shops and consequently
the receipt of larger refunds by the inside manufacturers, and the more
rapid exhaustion of the unemployment funds of the outside shops.From
June to December, 1921 inside manufacturers paid into the fund $93,274
and received back $60,747; the outside employers paid in the same period
$9,609 and had refunded to them $3,293.Of the thirty-three inside
manufacturers, four received back their total contributions; three used up
all of their contributions, and thirty received refunds of smaller or greater
amounts.Of the forty outside employers, on the other hand, thirty-
three used up all their contributions and only seven received refunds.
Not until 1921 has there been any promising attempt to establish
by statutory enactment compulsory unemployment insurance for large
numbers of persons.On February 4, 1921 such a bill was introduced in
the Wisconsin' legislature by Senator Huber; on March 21, 1921 a bill of
the same character was introduced in the house of representatives of the
Pennsylvania legislature by Christian Miller;2 and about a year later a
similar bill was introduced in the legislature of Massachusetts3 by
Representative Shattuck.In many of their important features the three
bills bear a close resemblance to the various English acts.The statutory
definition of unemployment follows closely the English provisions, restric-
tions are placed on the benefit periods, waiting periods are provided, and
the administration of the insurance scheme is connected intimately with
the conduct of a system of public employment exchanges.In other
respects, however, the English legislation and that proposed in the United
States show striking Under both the Wisconsin and Massa-
chusetts bills, the burden of raising the necessary unemployment fund is
not apportioned among the state, employer, and employed, but is imposed
entirely on the employer.The amount of contribution, likewise, does
not vary alone in proportion to the number of employees but is graded
with reference to the unemployment risk of particular employers.The
insurance carrier is no longer the state, as in England, but a liability
insurance company or a mutual insurance company.Elaborate provi-
'1921 Wisconsin Senate Bill No. 122.
21921Pennsylvania House Bill No. 1100.
1922 Massachusetts House Bill No. 278.340 BUSINESSCYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
sions are embodied in the bills for the organization of agencies qualifiec
to study the employment experience of the insured employers, to fix anc
supervise the fixing of the proper premiums, and to establish the propei
charges and credits.None of the bills have yet become law.But if anc
when they do, they will in all probability represent the first seriow
experiments in preventing unemployment through the medium of
scheme of unemployment insurance.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The experience of England with compulsory unemployment insure
ance, under conditions both favorable and highly adverse, has not sup-
ported the argument of those who had predicted it would be unwork-
able.By the creation of adequate machinery and by coupling thc
insurance scheme with a comprehensive system of employment
unemployment can for practical purposes be defined and fraud and
evasion largely eliminated.Rules can be laid down and enforced which
define unemployment in consonance with the customs and practices ol
the country in which the scheme operates.The whole history of thc
functions of the insurance officer, the Courts of Referees, and the TJmpirc
make it entirely clear that the interpretation of statutory rules car
proceed along lines that commend themselves to the common sense ol
the community.
So far as unemployment insurance is designed to afford relief tc
the unemployed, the English system has also revealed the possibilities ol
compulsory insurance.The benefits, to be sure, have been small; Eng-
lishmen and foreigners have complained of this mere pittance; but condi-
tions in England doubtless have been considerably better than they
would have been in the absence of the insurance.'Workmen,
who have received unemployment benefit have been made aware of the
difference between benefits and doles.The opposition to compulsory
state insurance that characterized the debates preceding the adoption
of the Act of 1911 has in large measure subsided.Little is now said
of paternalism and of unwarranted state interference with private enter-
prise.Criticism of the scheme of unemployment insurance is, to be
sure, as widespread and as vigorous as it ever was.But the terms of
the criticism are not to any considerable extent concerned with general
opposition to state insurance but rather with opposition to particular
features of the system.Employers find the cost of administration too
high.They condemn what seems to them an undue laxity in the pay-
ment of benefits.The employment exchanges are not as efficient as
they might be.The trade unions and workingmen's groups, on the
other hand, find the benefits too little to be satisfactory.They would
'This conclusion may be valid; but where is the evidence to convince a sceptic?—
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likeindustries to assume a greater share of the responsibility for unem-
ployment and, in some instances, they recommend a differentiation in
the rates of contributions.After the manner of the proposed American
legislation, they would impose the total cost of unemployment benefits
on the industry and would require no contributions from working-
men.Thus the experience of ten years in England has shifted discussion
from opposition to a principle to scrutiny of specific administrative
devices.With all of its possible shortcomings, it is probably no exaggera-
tion to conclude that compulsory insurance against unemployment has
become a permanent feature of English economic life.
It is with regard to the problem of unemployment prevention that
the English scheme has made its smallest contribution.Yet it is just at
this point that progress is most necessary.Once or twice timid steps in
the direction of prevention were made through the British scheme, but,
for one reason or another, they soon came to naught.Bills introduced
in American legislatures have put their emphasis on penalizing unem-
ployment to the extent of promoting prevention, and if these should be
passed in the near future, as their supporters hope, America will be the
first to have this type of legislation.The bills pending in Wisconsin,
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts represent the outlines of measures
that stress prevention.In them, as in oui workmen's compensation
legislation, the compulsory payment of benefit is coupled with a premium
rate structure that penalizes unfavorable experience and rewards the
favorable.In theory, at least, the incentive to prevention is provided.
It will not do, however, to become too sanguine over the probable effects
of this type of insurance, sound as it seems in principle.An insurance
premium does not exercise its full preventive influence just because there
are differentials advantageous to some insurers and disadvantageous to
others.No matter what the differentials, prevention will probably not
be accomplished until the premiums are in absolute amount at a very
high level.As E. II. Downey has pointed out in his discussion of work-
men's compensation legislation, prevention is achieved when the cost
of non-prevention becomes greater than that of prevention.Unem-
ployment, likewise, will probably not be reduced substantially through
insurance if it is cheaper to pay the insurance premium than to take the
measures necessary to reduce unemployment.'
'"We have given much lip service to the principle of industrial responsibility but
our practice has fallen far short of our professions... preventionis much short of what
would be attained under an adequate scale of benefits....Effectivesafety engineering
costs much money...Toreduce the fatality rate from three to two per million tons
of coal is perfectly feasible, but when the saving represents only one-quarter cent per
ton it does not pay.If the average cost per death were raised from $2,500 to $10,000
much would become practical which is now deemed visionary."DOWNEY, E. H.,
American Compensation Laws, American Labor Legislation R&iew, March, 1922,
vol. XII,No.1, p. 55.